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Structural change is at the heart of economic modernization. For 
catching up of an economy can be interpreted as the result of 
exceptionally quick growth in certain more modern branches, 
meanwhile other activities’ economic role should decline. Struc-
tural change has long been regarded as a primary source of 
economic growth, but it became ever more important in the con-
text of development economics and most currently in relationship 
with transition economies. Yet, this paper tries to elabourate the 
various avenues how structural change could contribute to catch-
ing up of Hungarian manufacturing industries. The paper con-
centrates on statistical analysis trying to establish linkages between 
a set of structural change indicators and another set of economic 
performance indicators. This exercise verifies the modernization 
role of structural change: branches with high and increasing 
value added and productivity gained weight. Attempts were also 
made to relate the research findings to some existing strings of 
economic literature. Thus, the paper provides a shift-share analy-
sis of productivity growth. Despite of methodological difficulties 
and data reliability problems this paper could verify the logic of 
structural change which is heading towards branches with higher 
levels of value added. However, no convincing evidence was 
found that the fast growing branches and activities were the 





Structural change and competitiveness 
are two interrelated phenomena, and few 
economists would challenge the statement 
that ways of changes in economic struc-
ture can enhance countries’ competitive-
ness. In order to verify the hypothesis, 
we need to define the two notions, and 
this is not an easy task. There are many 
competing interpretations for both. There 
is even an open debate if the term com-
petitiveness can be applied for countries 
and national economies, or this is rather 
a microeconomic term. Even if we agree 
on the application of competitiveness in 
national terms, there are very many an-
gles how this competitiveness is regarded. 
Competitiveness can be regarded as su-
perior export performance, as ability to 
sell on both domestic and foreign mar-
kets, as having an economic structure 
that is regarded advanced and includes 
strong high-technology industries, as hav-
ing strong national innovation system, 
etc.1 
The analysis of economic structure 
and structural change is likewise a very 
heterogeneous topic. I deal with this is-
sue a little more in detail.2 The original 
idea of observing the role of structural 
change in economic development was 
part of the string of thought that be-
came later the backbone of development 
economics. This approach dealt with 
changes in the share of broader eco-
                                                 
* Paper prepared in Work Package 3 of the 5th 
Framework Project “Changes in industrial com-
petitiveness as a factor of integration: Identifying 
challenges of the enlarged single european mar-
ket” (Ref. HPSE-CT-2002-00148) The content of 
the paper reflects the author’s opinion, and not 
those of IWE or the contractor of the research 
project. 
1 For an appropriate description of competitive-
ness interpretations see Anna Wziatek-Kubiak’s 
paper Wziatek-Kubiak (2003). 
2 The main points of this very brief description 
are taken over from the paper of Marczewski 
and Szczygielski (2005) 
nomic sectors like agriculture, industry 
and services and analyzed the macroeco-
nomic implications of the changes. The 
best-known scholar of the topic was 
Simon Kuznets. More recent studies of 
structural change tried to operationalize 
the notion and introduce appropriate 
measurement devices. They restricted 
therefore the focus of analysis on meas-
uring scale and intensity of structural 
change in particular sectors and on the 
impacts of the change on various eco-
nomic indicators. Thus, the range of 
phenomena became limited to some 
measurable aspects, and the broader de-
velopment aspects were not included in 
their research. 
But structural change is not solely 
understood as changing shares and roles 
of economic sectors (observed at various 
levels of aggregation). Many policy-
related papers regard “structure” as the 
whole economic superstructure of coun-
tries, and talk about structural changes 
and reforms very much in the sense of 
institutional changes that affect macro-
economic performance. Marczewski and 
Szczygielski (2005) quote only one albeit 
very emblematic document that uses this 
approach: the Kok Report. Needless to 
say, this very broad interpretation of 
structure and structural change when 
used for transition economies covers in-
numerous details and aspects ranging 
from privatization and price liberalization 
to innovation policy and beyond. All 
these aspects are obviously closely related 
to competitiveness, or at least to certain 
perceptions of competitiveness, and are 
documented in detail in the Lisbon Strat-
egy of the EU. However, economic analy-
sis usually focuses on changes in eco-
nomic structure captured by observations 
of production statistics, even if these 
changes are discussed in relationship 
with the developments in the institutional 
background. What Marczewski and 
Szczygielski rightly stress in this relation-
ship is that research into economic struc-
tures should be about the allocation of 
resources, therefore, the focus of eco-
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nomic analysis should be kept on issues 
that have sound operational meaning.  
Another potential avenue of interpret-
ing the notion of structural change can 
be an overview of the main research ar-
eas and problems that came up in the 
past when analyzing structural change. 
Marczewski and Szczygielski identified 
five major approaches. The first stream 
of analyses observed the very process of 
structural change and measures dynam-
ics, stability and direction of changes. 
The development aspect comes into the 
picture when changes in economic struc-
ture are combined with measures of 
“development” like per capita GDP, and 
certain levels of development are attrib-
uted to various qualities of economic 
structure (like declining share of agricul-
ture, or first growing then stagnating or 
declining share of industry, etc.). This 
type of problem setting is obviously very 
much used in the literature of develop-
ment economics. A potential use of this 
research is to draw conclusions for eco-
nomic policy like which branches’ devel-
opment should be supported in order to 
achieve an economic structure typical for 
higher level of development.3 More re-
cent studies on the direction of struc-
tural change are carried out on more 
disaggregated level. They seek to link 
observed changes to other economic phe-
nomena, particularly economic growth, 
employment and productivity. A popular 
analytical tool for this comparison is the 
shift-share analysis. 
The second main topic is the relation-
ship of structural change and economic 
growth measured at high level of aggre-
gation. Kuznets’ hypothesis of bigger 
structural change and faster GDP growth 
was also tested recently. Aiginger (2000) 
could prove the hypothesis using manu-
facturing industry data of EU countries. 
                                                 
3 We do not go into detailed discussion of the 
topic here, but draw the attention to the fact, 
that the causal relationship of economic structure 
and level of development is most probably oppo-
site: having “modern” economic structure does 
not necessarily result in higher level of develop-
ment. 
Wyznikiewicz (1987), however, came to 
different conclusion. The third kind of 
research tries to establish relationship 
between structural change in the strict 
sense (changing shares of sectors) and 
structural change in the broad sense 
(economic system development). This type 
of research usually picks one certain 
feature of the economic system and tries 
to relate its changes to changing struc-
ture of production or employment.  
Fourth Marczewski and Szczygielski 
mention papers that tried to reveal the 
determinants of structural change (in the 
strict sense). This is a rather difficult 
undertaking, since causalities usually 
work in both directions. The main de-
terminants of structural change more 
frequently in use are: changes in the 
structure of demand, technical and or-
ganizational progress, labour-capital sub-
stitution and international trade. Only 
few papers came up with clear and 
sound evidence. The fifth type of re-
search is of normative nature and evalu-
ates directions of changes in economic 
structure whether they took directions 
that the authors assumed desirable. Here 
again materials of the European Commis-
sion concerning evaluation of the pro-
gress towards the Lisbon Strategy goals 
can be mentioned. In contrast to the 
firstly mentioned string of research here 
structure is related to a hypothetically 
“optimal” status, not to level of devel-
opment.  
As is seen, there are many different 
interpretations and research methods 
concerning structural change, and it is 
rather difficult to find a theoretically 
and methodologically equally proven hy-
pothesis and research method. It is 
equally difficult to find a precise way of 
problem setting. The relationship of 
structural change and competitiveness 
(various measures of perceived competi-
tiveness) is perhaps better approached 
through the first and fourth method de-
scribed in the previous paragraphs. If 
we put aside for a moment interpreta-
tion problems of competitiveness then this 
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means that indices of structural change 
can be related to economic variables 
(supposed to describe aspects of competi-
tiveness). We can also try to identify the 
determinants of structural change. How-
ever, if we use in the analysis such basic 
economic indicators as per capita output, 
per capita value added, measures of in-
vestment effort and profitability the cau-
sality problem emerges in both ap-
proaches. The first approach is aimed to 
describe the first causal link: structural 
change improves performance. The latter 
approach describes the other: better per-
forming branches grow faster. Both ways 
have their economic rationale. In such 
circumstances a precise mapping of the 
situation at disaggregated levels of 
manufacturing industry and the meas-
urement of the strength of correlation as 
well as its change over time seem to be 
a plausible research task. In other 
words, we can try to prove that there is 
a measurable degree of economic ration-
ale behind structural changes. We can 
also gather information about the main 
directions of the changes, and also the 
major avenues where this rationale is 
reinforced (see the differences in the use 
of various measures). 
Thus, what we aim to do is to ana-
lyze the economic rationale behind struc-
tural change, to see why there are dif-
ferences in industry growth rates, if bet-
ter performing (more competitive) indus-
tries grow faster than others. If the 
analysis can prove the logic of different 
growth patterns, we can try do define 
more precisely what is behind, what are 
the main factors of structural change. 
This type of exercise may seem to be 
strange and superfluous, since we could 
simply use the same methodology; for 
example, relate a measure of structural 
change to the rate of economic growth 
or make shift share analysis of various 
macroeconomic indicators. However, 
more complex and cautious approach is 
in place here. The empirical evidence 
strongly suggests that the process of 
structural change has been very unique 
in transition economies. Therefore, those 
research methods that were based on the 
usual economic processes of “standard” 
economic environments have very strong 
and, yet, hardly described drawbacks 
and handicaps. It is not by chance that 
Marczewski and Szczygielski found very 
controversial results when comparing 
their aggregate measures of structural 
change with economic growth rates. The 
same exercise with Hungarian figures 
did not prove the hypothesis of quicker 
economic growth resulting in higher de-
gree of structural change either. We can 
also recall as a warning many of the 
early “victory reports” of various gov-
ernments of transition economies or the 
shallow progress reports on transition 
prepared by various important interna-
tional institutions that all emphasized that 
decisive structural/institutional changes 
were achieved already in the first half of 
the 1990s. 
For example, the Hungarian govern-
ment proudly emphasized in 1992–3 that 
foreign trade turnover was successfully 
reoriented from the former COMECON 
markets to Western markets. Yes, the 
relational structure indeed changed sub-
stantially but at dramatically declining 
export performance! Or we can also 
mention that the broad sectors of the 
Hungarian economy approached the 
structure of developed countries with 
rapidly increasing services sector and 
declining agriculture, mining and indus-
try. But again, parallel with the real 
growth of the services sector agriculture, 
mining and industry declined very 
quickly partly due to severe economic 
policy mistakes and partly due to the 
lack of restructuring on company level. 
Was it perhaps from the competitiveness 
viewpoint a positively perceived process 
when the share of such industries like 
microelectronics or consumer electronics 
fell back virtually to zero by the year 
2004? 
It seems, that the process of struc-
tural change was carried out at several 
different ways during the 1990s in Hun-
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gary. The different types of processes 
had controversial impact on macroeco-
nomic figures and on competitiveness. 
Structural change also occurs if there is 
only decline in certain sectors and stag-
nation in others. The early period of 
transition was very much featured by the 
contraction process of ailing firms in 
Hungary.4 Due to the special circum-
stances and problems of transition very 
different companies run into red during 
these years, many of them potentially 
viable and promising. Thus, the “selection 
process” was rather arbitrary and not 
always influenced by the logic of com-
petitiveness (as perceived by us). On the 
other hand, in some cases some compa-
nies that should have quitted early due 
to obvious handicaps in the transition 
process were kept alive.5 This practice 
must have distorted the speed and direc-
tion of changes in economic structure 
from the hypothetical logic of more 
growth in more competitive sectors. The 
various ways of distortions seriously 
challenge the applicability of standard 
methods of analysis in the first half of 
the 1990s.  
The other important avenue of signifi-
cant and quick structural change was 
the establishment of the foreign-owned 
sector in Hungary during the second 
half of the 1990s. Borsi et al. (1998) 
analyzed NACE 3-digit-level data and 
proved the very strong growth effect 
and increasing trade intensity of the 
evolving foreign sector, especially in elec-
tronics and the automotive industry. The 
then opened growth pattern continued 
over time and these two sectors re-
mained fastest growing also in the 2000s 
in Hungary. This change has been a 
positive one, that is, its speed and direc-
tion was deliberately chosen by economic 
agents. We may expect that behind these 
                                                 
4 For a comprehensive analysis of the contraction 
during the early phase of transition see 
Balcerowicz et al. (1998). 
5 Although state accommodation was stronger in 
other transition economies than in Hungary, a 
number of companies received intensive state 
subsidization in the mid 1990s. 
important and large-scale investment de-
cisions there is identifiable economic ra-
tionale, and these investments served the 
increase of competitiveness of the 
branches where they were implemented. 
However, this process was not that 
straightforward either. For sure, massive 
investments in production and services 
strongly influenced economic growth in 
Hungary, especially after 1998, when 
many of the new investments started ac-
tual operation.  
On the other hand, if we try to add 
something to this simple observation, it is 
not so obvious that all foreign invest-
ments contributed to positive structural 
change in the broader sense, at least not 
in the first few years of their operation. 
There is plenty of empirical evidence that 
describes the evolution process of foreign 
firms’ activities in Hungary.6 They usu-
ally started less sophisticated activities 
like assembling using unskilled labour, 
producing little local added value. It was 
only several years later, after gathering 
positive experiences of working with 
Hungarian labour force under circum-
stances of the Hungarian economy, when 
the activity structure was changed, sub-
stantially broadened and developed in the 
level of sophistication and income gen-
eration. Simple statistical analysis cannot 
capture this important development proc-
ess either: more detailed analysis is re-
quired.  
The two different processes that 
shaped the development process of Hun-
garian manufacturing during the 1990s 
took place on various levels of the econ-
omy. What we are interested in now is 
if there were inter-industry shifts, that is 
if some less competitive branches con-
tracted rather, meanwhile other, more 
competitive sectors expanded. However, 
similar process took place within indus-
tries (with mass-scale exit and entry of 
                                                 
6 The process is described by several authors, 




companies in the same branch),7 and on 
firm level.8 The popular measuring 
method of the impacts of structural 
change, the shift-share analysis is a good 
tool to separate “within the industry” (or 
firm) and structural impacts (see Fage-
berg’s, Peneder’s or Aiginger’s related 
papers). In all these cases similar logic 
should play a role: resources are allo-
cated towards more competitive, more 
profitable use on different levels. The 
result must be better performance of 
firms, industries and economies on ag-
gregate level.  
Gacs (2003) compared the process of 
structural change in transition economies 
using NACE 2-digit-level output data for 
the years 1989–1999. He found Hungary 
as an outlier in comparison to other 
transition economies in Central Europe. 
Structural change was found much 
quicker and more fundamental. The 
large-scale structural change was caused 
mainly by the increase of the electronics 
sector, to a lesser extent automotive in-
dustry. When compared changes of out-
put and value added, it turned out that 
much of the increase in the turnover of 
the electronics sector was due to screw-
driver activities, was in a sense artifi-
cially inflated. When electronics was 
taken out from calculations Hungarian 
economic structure became more similar 
to other countries. Gacs’s results sugges-
tively illustrated the rather controversial 
nature of Hungarian economic develop-
ment, the existence of the two main 
processes (downsizing and expansion), 
the true background of statistical mira-
cles (inflated turnover and export figures 
of certain branches), but also the devel-
opment process of foreign affiliates’ ac-
tivity, that we described earlier.  
                                                 
7 The dynamics of market exit and entry on the 
example of the transition economies is extensively 
discussed in Balcerowicz et al. (2002). 
8 We refer here to the widely used distinction of 
the terms “passive restructuring” and “strategic 
restructuring” first used by Grosfeld and Roland 
(1996). 
Given the rather controversial nature 
of structural change in Hungary a 
proper analysis and especially the de-
scription of structural changes’ impact 
on competitiveness requires the use of 
several research methods and aspects. 
The hypothesis itself must be formulated 
in a rather broad way in order to es-
cape the trap of narrowing down the 
focus to one particular aspect. A plausi-
ble general hypothesis would be if struc-
tural change followed the general eco-
nomic logic and channelled resources 
towards more competitive branches? Is 
there a possibility of verifying linkages 
between measures of structural change 
and measures of competitiveness?  
In order to find answers to these 
questions several approaches were used. 
First we analyzed the process and meas-
ures of structural change. Three simple 
measures of structural change in two 
calculation methods were analyzed to 
measure the cumulative extent of struc-
tural change over the time span of 1998 
and 2003. We also calculated aggre-
gated measures for the individual years, 
and compared the figures with the 
growth rates of the Hungarian economy. 
Then, using the sectoral data for two 
periods (1995–1997 and 1998–2003) a 
list of winners and losers of structural 
change was created. The groups were 
described and confronted to some em-
pirical facts. The first part of the paper 
is concluded with a shift-share analysis 
of labour productivity, which also intro-
duces the second part. 
In the second part we focus on the 
competitiveness/performance measures. 
The analysis of the relationships between 
the various competitiveness factors is 
provided. Then structural change and 
performance indicators are linked 
through Spearman rank correlation index 
and panel regression analysis. The third 
part describes two further attempts at 
refining the research results. The sample 
was split into sub-samples, and the basic 
correlations were calculated for the sin-
gle groups. Lastly we used two compos-
  
10 
ite measures of performance/competi-
tiveness and measured their correlation 
with the structural change measures. The 
paper is completed with conclusions. 
Data for the calculations was gener-
ated from several sources. Hungarian 
manufacturing figures were provided by 
the Central Statistical Office, EU manu-
facturing data was provided by New 
Cronos database, trade data was taken 
from Comext. Since NACE 3-digit-level 
data was first available for the year 
1998 our time frame of research was 
restricted to the period 1998–2003. In 
certain parts of the analysis we could 
use the calculations of Borsi et al. (1998) 
for the years 1993–1997.  
1) STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF 
THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY 
1998–2003 
Following Marczewski and Szczygielski 
analytical background we define struc-
tural change between years t and s as 
distance between the two points 
measured by a given metrics d . 
The points may represent branches’ 
shares in total manufacturing or 
GDP. They suggest two types of 
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conduct of some detailed structural 
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subset of branches K contributed to the 
overall change. To this end the following 
indicator of contribution to structural 































In order to measure the magnitude of 
changes in the Hungarian economy three 
structural change measures (nominal 
value added, sales, employment) were 
calculated for the whole period (1998–
2003) using both measurement methods. 
Also, the yearly changes were calculated 
that provided information on the intensity 
of the process. Table 1 contains the cal-
culation results. As is seen, yearly 
changes do not add up to the measures 
of the whole period. This suggests that 
the process of structural change was not 
a straightforward one. Most stability was 
shown by the employment measures, the 
higher volatility of value added and sales 
measures should be explained by higher 
sensibility to business cycles and tempo-
rary market conditions.  
 
Table 1 
Structural change (1998-2003) measured 











































Value Added(M) 14.2 13.6 27.1 20.6 20.3 43.7 
Sales (M) 14.4 12.1 19.2 16.2 13.8 37.7 
Employment (M) 11.0 11.0 9.1 14.7 9.7 26.8 
Value Added (E) 2.5 3.7 8.1 3.9 8.6 11.0 
Sales (E) 2.9 2.9 5.5 4.0 4.4 10.8 
Employment (E) 1.7 2.1 1.6 2.5 2.0 4.7 
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When compared the 
Hungarian figures with 
the Polish and some se-
lected EU countries’,  
which were provided by 
Marczewski and Szczy-
gielski for the period 
1996–2000, Hungarian 
figures show markedly 
higher values than any 
other country, though 
the period observed was 
not equally long and did 
not overlap fully in the 
two cases. Compared the 
year-to-year changes of 
Poland and Hungary, 
however, also shows 
higher values in the case 
of Hungary, though the 
difference is smaller. In the case of em-
ployment, the Euclidean measure showed 
figures of slightly above 1% in Poland 
and around 2% in Hungary; in case of 
sales 1,5–2,5% and 3–4% respectively. For 
value added we found very strong fluc-
tuation of the Hungarian figure, a steep 
drop in 2002. Otherwise, Polish figures 
were higher until 2000, Hungarian 
measures grew over in the years 2001 
and 2003. In both Poland and Hungary 
structural change in the production of 
value added was subsequently higher 
than sales.  
Data of Table 1 also suggests that the 
years 1999 and 2000 were characterized 
by a relatively high and stable change 
pattern that changed in the years 2001, 
2002 and 2003 when the pace of 
changes started to fluctuate strongly, 
and the levels of change increased 
(also in employment). Similar breaks 
in the process patterns could be ob-
served in Poland where the authors 
did not find evidence that the rate 
of economic growth was inducing 
quicker structural- change. A com-
parison of structural change meas-
ures and growth rates of the Hun-
garian economy provides us with 
similar insight (Figure 1).  
After the twin recession (1992/3 and 
1995/6) the Hungarian economy achieved 
considerably high growth rates that 
started to decline in 2001. The struc-
tural-change measures moved on a high 
but stable level in 1998–2000 and begun 
to fluctuate in 2001 when economic 
growth started to run out of steam. This 
means that structural change was more 
intensive and hectic during the years of 
slow growth. An explanation of this may 
be that sales and value-added figures 
are rather sensitive to negative conjunc-
ture changes. Crisis hit industries re-
duced output. Thus, it was perhaps 
rather the negative factor that dominated 
these years’ structural developments. 
The stability of the structural change 
process was measured by the relative 
Figure 1
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Sales 0.43 1.14 1.03 0.34 0.73 
Value added 0.36 0.57 0.47 0.35 0.44 
Employment 0.37 1.03 0.87 0.56 0.71 
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average deviations for the period 1998–
2002. Similarly to the Polish case, the 
change of employment showed the most 
consistent change pattern with relatively 
smaller average deviations than the two 
other measures. But value added and 
sales also proved to be rather stable 
changing certain particular years, though 
not throughout the whole period. (Table 
2) 
As mentioned earlier, the growth pat-
terns of the Hungarian economy changed 
over time during the 1990s. The first 
part until 1997 was characterized by 
sluggish growth and large scale changes 
in the environment when structural 
change mainly occurred through the 
negative process (contraction of 
branches). It was in 1997/8 when posi-
tive structural changes dominated eco-
nomic development with the mass-scale 
entry of foreign-owned facilities into full-
steam operation. As far as earlier peri-
ods are concerned, we used data from 
Borsi et al. to calculate structural-change 
measures. Since then no raw data was 
accessible. We could only use the annual 
growth rate figures of the sectors, and 
compared changes of growth rates, not 
sectors’ shares in total sales. Hence, 
these measures cannot be compared with 
the later period’s figures. Results are 
included in Figure 1. Structural-change 
measure was high during the recession 
years 1995–6, but further increased in 
1997 when economic growth took mo-
mentum again.  
But which were the industries that in-
creased their share being the “winners” 
and who were the “losers” whose share 
declined over time? As it is seen in Fig-
ure 2, there were approximately the 
same number of winners and losers over 
time: 23 branches lost weight in both 
periods, 23 gained, 12 first gained then 
lost weight, 29 first contracted then ex-
panded. Table 3 contains the branches of 
the four groups. 
Winners of the transition process were 
food industry (15), paper-publishing-
printing (21-22), various material inten-
sive industries, including plastic and fab-
ricated metal products (28). All of them 
were local-market suppliers that gained 
excessive turnover with rising living 
standards and consumption in Hungary. 
Out of the internationally cooperated 
branches only two low-end industries 
boomed during both periods: cable and 
electronics parts manufacturing (this lat-
ter after the complete collapse of the 
Hungarian-owned electronics industry in 
1992–3). It seems that changes in domes-
tic demand were a very important driv-
ing force of structural change through-
out the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Figure 2 











Winners and losers of structural change 
 
Branches that ex-
panded in both peri-
ods (23) 
151 152 153 156 174 
211 212 222 223 242 
247 264 271 273 281 
282 313 321 335 355 
362 363 365 
First contracting then 
expanding (30) 
157 171 172 175 176 
181 182 183 191 192 
193 201 202 204 205 
221 241 246 261 283 
285 287 292 295 300 
322 343 353 361 366 
First expanding then 
contracting (12) 
245 251 252 262 266 
291 293 316 323 341 
352 364 
Contracting in both 
periods (23) 
154 158 159 160 203 
232 243 244 263 265 
267 272 274 286 294
 297 311 312 314 315 
342 351 354 
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It is also interesting to look at the 
second group of branches that could 
successfully stabilize their position, and 
recovered some initial decline. We find 
here large parts of the textile industry 
(17), leather and footwear (18, 19), 
wood products (20), parts of the chemi-
cal industry (24), segments of the metal 
industry (28), general machinery, com-
puters, telecommunications equipment, 
aircraft repair. Generally low-tech indus-
tries again, with a few exceptions, those 
branches where foreign investments were 
concentrated. This means, that there was 
an important concentration process in 
the Hungarian manufacturing industry. 
Within certain branches the contraction 
process was paralleled and later offset 
by the creation of new facilities. 
It is also interesting to see the list of 
contracting branches. Here we can re-
peatedly find many branches where 
Hungarian production does not seem to 
be at a handicapped position, neverthe-
less, due to the international concentra-
tion process they leaked out of Hungar-
ian competence. Hungarian markets are 
growingly served from other countries’ 
production in these branches. Industries 
like fine chemicals, drugs, agricultural 
machinery, consumer electronics, electri-
cal apparatus industry and others are 
good examples where there is competitive 
Hungarian production while the branches 
grew more slowly than other industries. 
But there were also industries that con-
tinued contracting, such as much of the 
building materials industry and basic 
metal products. Also, there were some 
industries where the expansion of the 
demand was slow (previous levels were 
high), hence production grew also slowly 
(branches of the food industry). 
If we compare these findings with our 
knowledge of the restructuring process 
of the Hungarian manufacturing indus-
try, we can point out some important 
factors that seem to have an important 
influence on structural change. First of 
all, the increase of the general welfare 
increased demand for a wide range of 
consumer goods, much of which is tradi-
tionally produced near to the consuming 
markets. These sectors grew fastest, and 
without major interruption. Some of the 
branches were turned over through new 
investments (mostly foreign), or through 
the establishment of new cooperation 
linkages abroad (we can count here also 
the growing throughout the 1990s sub-
contracting in textiles, leather, fabricated 
metal and chemical products). The time 
horizon of the available data did not 
allow us to monitor the years 2004 and 
2005 when some of these activities were 
abandoned causing a likely change in 
their percentage share in production and 
employment. 
Then the less vigorously growing part 
of the Hungarian manufacturing con-
tained many of those industries which 
were also developed through foreign in-
vestments. These industries’ development, 
however, was either slower than the con-
traction of some other less viable parts 
of the same branch, or the concentration 
of production reduced output of some 
products that were produced elsewhere 
in international cooperation networks, 
and this contraction was not offset by 
increasing turnover of other products. 
Last, but not least, there were also in-
dustries that underwent restructuring 
and ended up with much smaller in size 
production scope after only profit-making 
competitive activities were continued.  
As the next step, we try to find out 
the reason of the differences in the 
structural change measures of employ-
ment and sales (value added). For the 
rather stable employment change pattern 
may reflect either the smaller growth of 
highly productive branches, or the rather 
robust growth of less productive indus-
tries. As it is seen on the list of winners 
there is a number of highly productive 
internationalized production networks 
that took strong roots in the second half 
of the 1990s in Hungary. But there are 
also many more traditional industries 
possibly with lower levels of per capita 
output that significantly increased share 
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in production and employment. Also, the 
peculiar jumps and drops in the value 
added measure require some explanation. 
We will check these issues by examining 
the change of the aggregate apparent 
labour productivity in the manufacturing 
industry (i.e. per capita value added and 
per capita sales). A popular analytical 
tool for this purpose is the “shift and 
share” technique, based on the following 
identity: 
iiiiii srsrsrr ∆∆+∆+∆=∆ ∑∑∑  
where r stands for labour productivity 
and is  for the share of the i-th industry 
in manufacturing employment. Operator 
∆  denotes the difference in the variable 
between 1998 and 2003 while symbols 
without ∆  – for instance is  – stand for 
the value of variables in the base year 
(1998).  
The interpretation of the 
three components is the fol-
lowing. The first component 
measures the productivity 
change within industries, the 
“within-growth effect” 
(Savona, 2004). If there is 
no structural change at all, 
this is equal to the overall 
productivity change. If we 
allow structural change, i.e. 
employment in certain 
branches grows/declines faster than in 
others, then the second component meas-
ures the impact of these differences in 
employment growth on productivity, pro-
vided there is no productivity growth 
within industries. This factor is called by 
Savona “the static shift effect”. The third 
component combines productivity growth 
within industries with structural change. 
This component measures the gain or 
loss in productivity attributable to labour 
shifting towards branches with 
higher/lower than average productivity 
growth. Hence it is called the “dynamic 
shift effect”. In analyses seeking to relate 
growth to structural changes the second 
component is interpreted as the effect of 
labour moving to more productive 
branches and the third one – as the ef-
fect of labour moving to most dynamic 
industries. (Table 4) 
The explanation of the results is that 
productivity change in Hungary was de-
termined by within the industry changes 
rather, than by structural shifts. While 
this phenomenon is similar in many de-
veloped economies (Savona, 2004; Fager-
berg, 1999), the very strong negative 
impact of the dynamic shift effect on the 
per capita value added measure is quite 
unusual. This means, that labour was 
increasingly employed in branches with 
slowly growing productivity levels, 
though, specialization increased in higher 
than average productivity industries. In 
other words, specialization increased in 
branches with already high level of pro-
ductivity where there is less further pro-
ductivity growth potential. 
2) THE COMPETITIVENESS 
(PERFORMANCE) MEASURES 
With the introduction of the shift-share 
analysis we turned back to the general 
performance and competitiveness of the 
Hungarian manufacturing industry. Next 
we seek to examine potential links be-
tween various aspects of competitiveness 
and structural change. Since we do not 
use a precise definition of competitiveness 
we use a broader range of performance 
measures. First the existence of causal 
Table 4
Results of the shift and share analysis of labour productivity 
1998–2003 
(value added/employed persons; sales revenue/employed persons) 
 





VA/L 15.10% 25.19% 4.68% -14.76% 
Y/L 65.61% 52.26% 10.54% 2.83% 
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link between performance measures and 
structural change measures will be tested 
with the use of Spearman rank correla-
tion indexes. Then, panel regression 
analysis will be introduced in order to 
verify the existing correlations. 
We calculated the following measures: 
1. value added per employed persons 
2. sales turnover per employed per-
sons 
3. value added per sales revenue 
4. profits per sales revenue 
5. average investment effort (cumu-
lated investments per cumulated 
sales) 
6. cash flow per sales 
7. profit per employed persons 
We calculated changes over the inves-
tigated period (1998–2001) of the per-
formance measures, then ranking list of 
the individual measures were created. 
Likewise, rankings of the three structural 
change measures (value added, sales 
turnover and employment) were created. 
While analyzing the raw measures no 
strong fit between the performance 
measures and the structural change 
measures could be observed. In order to 
find statistically meaningful correlation of 
performance and structural measures, 
before we continued with the calculation 
of the Spearman rank correlation indices 
we refined our database as well as in-
troduced some new measures. The 
changes were the following: 
(1) The first minor but methodologically 
important refinement was deflation of 
the figures, using the separate price 
indices of the individual NACE 3-
digit-level groups. Since most indica-
tors compared relative changes of 
measures this refinement should not 
have caused dramatic changes, but 
since there were 10-15% differences 
between various groups in the price 
indices concerning the whole period, 
minor changes in the rankings could 
be observed. 
(2) More important change was the 
comparison of moving averages in-
stead of first and last years’ values. 
There were branches that provided 
fluctuating figures over the years. To 
avoid the impact of random peaks 
and drops of figures, we decided to 
use moving averages. In case of 
Hungary, the rather short period of 
observation (four whole years) pro-
vided only the calculation of the first 
and last two years’ averages. In 
other countries with six years’ data 
series three-year averages were calcu-
lated.  
(3) In order to widen the analytical pos-
sibilities, we prepared four sets of 
calculations. The four sets were dif-
ferent from two aspects. We calcu-
lated indices using changes in abso-
lute figures (of the moving averages) 
and differences in growth rates. On 
the other hand, we compared indices 
of structural change to starting levels 
of performance measures (structural 
change measures versus ranking of 
the 1998 absolute figures of per-
formance measures), and in the sec-
ond set to changes of structural 
measures (calculated the same way as 
structural change indices).  
As next step of the analysis we com-
pared the performance measures with 
each other for the four available years. 
This comparison could also bring some 
interesting correlations though, obviously, 
in many cases correlation is primarily 
determined by the usage of figures with 
the same origin. Table 5 contains the 
results. 
Table 5 contains plenty of information, 
but we would like to emphasize only a 
few interesting issues. Let us start the 
analysis with the statement that rankings 
of the various performance indicators in 
the single years always mean a compari-
son of rankings based on absolute levels 
of the indicators, not changes over time. 
They show if the ranking of branches 
according to one and another measure 
are similar or not. The one extreme is 
the complete coincidence of the rankings, 
like that of row 6 in 1998, where the 
two rankings were found completely 
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identical. This is just a little surprising 
since a strong correlation of the two 
measures can be expected: sale – mate-
rial cost = value added, and both meas-
ures are divided by the same figure of 
employment. Nevertheless, this is an out-
standing fit, the next strongest is 
“merely” 0.9. A second important obser-
vation is that in almost all rows we can 
discover a declining trend of the strength 
of correlation. In many cases this declin-
ing strength is quite dramatic changing 
the level of significance from 1 to 5 per 
cent, and in one case even to the lack 
of correlation.  
Another interesting feature is that al-
most all performance measures positively 
correlate, which is very much in the line 
of our expectations. We used positive 
measures of performance, where higher 
levels mean better performance. Never-
theless, in row 5 we can see two meas-
ures that correlate negatively. Moreover, 
in some years the correlation is signifi-
cant, though not especially strong. Value 
added/sales and sales/employment are 
the two measures, 
which is the added-
value content of sales 
and the per capita 
sales level. The negative 
correlation indicates 
that the higher is the 
productivity in a 
branch (per capita 
sales), the lower is the 
added value in the 
branch. This is an in-
teresting finding that 
suggests that automa-
tized production usually 
concentrates on minor 
handling procedures 
that has little added-
value content. 
A more positive link-
age is expressed by the 
figures of row 13. Here 
per capita added value 
is compared with the 
cash-flow content of 
sales. The positive and 
strong correlation in each year suggests, 
that the higher is the per capita added 
value (the more demanding the activity 
is), the higher potential cash-flow stream 
can be achieved. A clear incentive to 
specialize on activities that produce more 
value added.  
The third linkage that we would like 
to emphasize is profitability that is the 
realized profits compared to various 
measures. Rows 10, 11, 12 and 13 are 
of special interest from this angle. All 
these rows show strong but declining 
positive correlations. Row 10 says that 
the higher is the per capita turnover, the 
higher profits can be achieved. This is a 
very simple aspect; the contrary would 
be very much surprising. The next 11 
row is more interesting. It indicates that 
there was a positive correlation between 
the cash-flow and the profit content of 
sales in Hungarian manufacturing. This 
finding underpins our previous observa-
tion that investments did not reduce sub-
stantially the profit content of the cash-
Table 5 
Correlations of the various performance measures 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 Profit/sale – value added/sale 0.29** 0.28** 0.35** 0.32**
2 Profit/sale – value added/empl. 0.57** 0.47** 0.36** 0.24* 
3 value added/sale – value add/empl. 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 
4 Profit/sale – sale/empl. 0.57** 0.28** 0.18 0.16 
5 value added/sale – sale/empl. 0.05 -0.44** -0.49** -0.23* 
6 value added/empl. – sale/empl. 1.00** 0.89** 0.90** 0.76**
7 Profit/sale – profit/empl. 0.82** 0.60** 0.62** 0.22* 
8 value added/sale – profit/empl. -0.01 0.59** 0.46** 0.70**
9 value add/empl. – profit/empl. 0.86** 0.26* 0.15 0.33**
10 sale/empl. – profit/empl. 0.86** 0.60** 0.56** 0.39**
11 Profit/sale – cashflow/sales 0.70** 0.64** 0.68** 0.36**
12 value added/sale – cashflow/sales 0.57** 0.60** 0.62** 0.22* 
13 value add/empl. – cashflow/sales 0.74** 0.59** 0.46** 0.70**
14 sale/empl. – cashflow/sales 0.74** 0.26* 0.15 0.33**
15 profit/empl. – cashflow/sales 0.68** 0.60** 0.56** 0.39**
16 Profit/sale – investment  0.31** 0.13 0.00 
17 value added/sale – investment  -0.19 -0.20* -0.11 
18 value add/empl. – investment  0.45** 0.40** 0.37**
19 sale/empl. – investment  0.48** 0.43** 0.50**
20 profit/empl. – investment  0.45** 0.39** 0.20*
21 cashflow/sales – investment  0.21* 0.12 0.25* 
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flow stream. Most interesting of the 
three compared rows is row 12. Here 
the value added content and the cash-
flow content of sales is compared. That 
is two subsequent phases of the calcula-
tions; the difference between them is la-
bour costs. There was a dramatic drop 
in 2001, which means that in this year 
cash-flow levels were not necessarily 
highest in the branches where value 
added was also high. This probably 
meant that the pace or maybe even the 
direction of changes of cash-flow streams 
was different in that year than added-
value changes. This can be explained, 
for example, by the substantial real-wage 
increases of that year. The division ratio 
of the increasing locally added-value be-
tween labour, investment and profits 
started to change in that year, in favour 
of labour, and especially in those 
branches with higher value added. The 
continuously high and significant correla-
tions between per capita value added 
and cash-flow content of sales in row 13 
seems to contradict to this previous find-
ing of row 12. There is an opposite 
movement in the year 2001. If wage-cost 
content of value added increased in this 
year particularly in high value-added 
branches, the only possible explanation of 
the contradiction is that value added/ 
employee figures also dropped in 2001. 
This would mean either a rapid increase 
in employment in the better performing 
branches or a decrease of added value 
there. The later could 
be the case concern-
ing the starting reces-
sion on world mar-
kets in the year 2001. 
Last, but not least, 
we observed signifi-
cant correlation be-
tween investment and 
a series of perform-
ance measures. Not 
surprisingly, invest-
ment is low where 
profit is high. Produc-
tivity and profitability 
figures, on the other hand, show corre-
lation with investments. The more pro-
ductive branches and those with higher 
income spent more on investments. The 
correlation is not very strong.  
After the analysis of how the various 
performance measures are linked to-
gether, now we turn to figure out cor-
relations between the performance indica-
tors and the structural change measures, 
using the Spearman rank correlation 
method. Table 6 introduces the main 
findings of this analysis. Sales and em-
ployment measures of structural change 
did not produce many significant results. 
However, value added used as struc-
tural-change measure proved to be much 
more useful. It produced significant cor-
relations with all performance measures 
except investments. For obvious methodo-
logical reasons, correlation was strongest 
with per capita value-added figures, but 
not much less significant correlation was 
spotted with our cash-flow measure. 
Moreover, the correlation was significant 
at the 1 per cent level in both absolute 
terms and in the case of growth rates 
as well.  
The better results with using value-
added as structural measure can be 
partly explained by methodological rea-
sons. A comparison of employment and 
profit/sales would certainly mean corre-
lation of two completely different meas-
ures. Our value-added figures are calcu-
lated from sales data, thus the origin of 
Table 6
Correlation of structural and performance measures,  
Spearman rank correlation indices 
 
Absolute change figures 









Investments -0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.05 
Value added/employment 0.22* -0.14 0.54** 0.17 -0.17 0.54**
Cashflow/sales -0.03 -0.14 0.42** 0.06 -0.07 0.51**
Sales/employment 0.38** 0.00 0.26* 0.54** -0.02 0.33**
Profit/sales -0.01 -0.03 0.24* 0.08 -0.03 0.26* 
Value added/sales -0.22* -0.10 0.28** -0.30* -0.16 0.29**
Profit /employment 0.16 -0.05 0.39** 0.18 -0.04 0.36**
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the two variables is the same, to a cer-
tain degree they contain identical ele-
ments. The strongest is the similarity with 
value added/employment, of course. The 
description of the calculation method 
helps realize the reason and degree of 
similarity. The calculation procedure was 
the following: total sales – material costs 
(value added) – labour costs (cash flow) 
– depreciation (profits). Sales, value 
added, cash flow and profits were di-
vided by either sales or employment, to 
produce relative measures. 
Despite of the impact of similarity of 
the measures, we believe that changes in 
the rankings of branches along value 
added described the best the structural 
changes of the Hungarian manufacturing 
industry in the 1998–2001 period. This 
measure showed strong correlation with 
two performance measures, and did not 
deny the existence of correlation with 
four other performance measures. This 
observation leads to two conclusions. 
First, the logic of the hypothesis that 
structural changes must have a kind of 
standard economic rationale was proved. 
Structural change occurred in directions 
mainly where production resulted in 
higher level of cash flow and profits. 
Second, the nature of changes in Hun-
garian manufacturing during this period 
was rather complex. There was substan-
tial expansion and contraction in certain 
branches although, we believe, this was 
not comparable with magnitude of 
changes in the 1992–1996 period. 
Changes in size of 
branches did not 
prove to be influenced 
by the standard eco-
nomic rationale. The 
direction of changes 
was not always signifi-
cantly influenced by 
factors of competitive-
ness. On the other 
hand, there was a 
very important shift in 
production structure 
within branches. Dif-
ferences in capacities of producing 
higher share of local value added in-
creased. And this shift proved to be in-
fluenced by factors of competitiveness. 
Changes in value added were accompa-
nied by changes in profitability.  
The co-movement of the production of 
value added and profitability obviously 
indicates improvements in competitiveness 
of growing sectors. We can also spot 
the sources of increased competitiveness, 
i.e. local labour. The shift share analysis 
also showed that one source of improved 
competitiveness in the 1998–2001 period 
was a shifting towards activities produc-
ing higher level of value added. More 
added value can be divided among three 
major cost factors: labour cost, invest-
ment (depreciation) and profits. Our cal-
culations show no significant correlation 
with investments, therefore, the shift was 
largely achieved using existing capacities. 
The higher level of added value was ba-
sically realized as profits since until 2001 
there was only a modest increase in av-
erage wage costs (in fact, wages started 
to rapidly increase only in 2001).  
The relationship between performance 
measures and structural change meas-
ures can be also verified by a simple 
panel regression analysis. After having 
discussed the linkages and relationships 
of the measures the panel regression 
analysis introduces the relative differences 
among branches, not just their rankings, 
like the Spearman rank correlation in-
dex. Now yearly changes in the shares 
Table 7
Panel regression analysis of 6 performance (competitiveness) 
Measures and three structural change measures 
 
 VA/Y VA/L CASHF/Y Y/L PROFIT/Y PROFIT/L
DYw 4.8E-03 1.0E-06 1.4E-03 7.7E-07 8.3E-03 4.5E-0.6 
(P) 0.227 0.000** 0.760 0.000** 0.308 0.000** 
dLw -1.5E-03 1.7E-0.9 2.5E-04 1.8E-0.8 1.5E-0.3 1.3E-0.7 
(P) 0.087* 0.933 0.812 0.003** 0.429 0.076* 
dVAw 1.1E-0.2 1.4E-0.6 3.3E-01 4.7E-0.7 1.7E-0.1 3.4E-06 
(P) 0.005** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.029* 0.000 
* significant at 10 % level 
** significant at 1 % level
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of branches were explained by the per-
formance measures for the period 1998–
2003. The regression results are included 
in Table 7. 
The regression results largely sup-
ported the Spearman analysis. Value 














bly high value. 
Changes in employment were not ex-
plained by the performance measures 
except for per capita sales. Sales per 
employed persons proved to have signifi-
cant explanatory power also on changes 
of sales, however, the coefficient here 
was rather small. The same applied for 
per capita value added measure.  
3) TWO ATTEMPTS AT 
REFINING RESEARCH RESULTS: 
SAMPLE SPLIT AND 
COMPOSITE MEASURES 
Analysis of the structural-change figures 
proved that there are markedly different 
types of industries in Hungarian manu-
facturing. They are influenced by differ-
ent factors and their competitiveness 
(performance) is measured at different 
scales. Local market oriented industries 
proved to perform well during the whole 
1995–2003 period. Meanwhile export 
intensive and globalized industries 
showed very mixed results. Therefore, 
the manufacturing branches were divided 
into more homogenous groups. Relative 
export and import shares in total inputs 
and outputs were compared to average 
levels. We differentiated between four 
groups: one with above average export 
and import ratios (internationalized 
group – INT), one with below average 
value of both measures (non-
internationalized – NINT), one with 
higher export and lower import shares 
(export-oriented domestic supply depend-
ent – EIX) and one with lower export 
and high import ratio (domestic market 
oriented but import dependent – MIX). 
We calculated a variety of measures to 
characterize the groups. These are in-
cluded in Table 8 and in Figure 3. 
Each of the four groups contains 
roughly the same number of the 
branches, approximately one-fourth of 
the total sample. Nevertheless, their eco-
nomic functions and importance are dif-
ferent. Smallest in number but largest in 
both sales and value added is the inter-
nationalized branches’ group. Moreover, 
this is the most dynamic group. The 
growth rates of both sales and of turn-
over were by far the highest. The quick 
expansion is clearly fuelled by vigorous 
investment activity as well. At the same 
time, this is not the part of the economy 
where the highest profit margins are re-
alized. This is the more interesting since 
Hungary served as a tax heaven during 
the 1990s, and this made profit transfers 
to (and not from!) Hungary more likely. 
Table 8
Main features of the branch categories for the period 1998–2001 
 




















15.5 121.9 22.0 99.2 17.8 22.3 11.5 6.54 
INT 
(22) 
43.7 182.9 21.3 110.0 41.4 33.7 34.1 5.39 
EIX 
(24) 
11.0 119.8 27.8 95.1 18.6 17.5 8.7 9.64 
MIX 
(27) 
29.8 106.3 28.8 95.1 22.2 26.5 45.8 4.23 
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A possible explanation of this feature 
may be the dual structure of the inter-
nationalized sector. Besides the affiliates 
of large multinational companies, a large 
number of local firms also belong here, 
which take part in active processing ac-
tivity (subcontracting). The profit margins 
of this activity is thought to be below 
average though latest empirical surveys 
found evidence on the contrary, on 
higher than average profitability, at least 
in Hungarian companies. 
Most profitable is the export oriented, 
domestic supply dependent sector (EIX), 
but this has the lowest weight in Hun-
garian manufacturing sales and also in 
investments. The relatively high employ-
ment in this sector indicates above aver-
age labour intensity of these activities. 
The two domestic market oriented sec-
tors (NINT and MIX) also differ in size 
and composition. Import using processing 
for Hungarian markets also includes a 
large number of foreign dominated 
branches. This is the largest sector 
measured by employment and second 
largest by sales, after the international-
ized sector. Growth rates here are much 
smaller though than in the other foreign 
dominated sector. This observation very 
much corroborates with the general ex-
perience: Hungarian growth is fuelled 
basically by exports, the economy is very 
much dependent on the conjuncture of 
the European Union. However, domestic 
demand remained an important factor. 
Growth rates of employment and sales 
were second largest in group MINT. 
However, the data indicates a higher 
than average labour intensity in this sec-
tor as well: it seems, that labour inten-
sity is generally lower in the sectors that 
use more imported inputs. Profitability 
too, was second largest in this sector 
behind EIX. This means that the profit 
margins are higher in the two domestic 
input using sectors. This feature together 
with higher labour intensity provides the 
impression that labour intensive, local 
source-based activities’ profitability is 
higher: they enjoy comparative advantage.  
The homogeneity of the sample was 
tested in the next step. Hence, it is im-
portant to see if and to what extent are 
inter-group differences bigger than intra-
group differences. Put it another way, 
the standard deviations of measures 
within the branch-groups may be much 
smaller, than among the groups of 
branches. We tested eight measures for 
the four groups of companies. In this 
analysis we used different threshold lev-
els (30%) and also considered the domi-
nant ownership pattern of the branch. 
Figure 3
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The first group consisted of branches 
that imported and exported more than 
30 per cent of their production inputs 
and sales, moreover, they had over 30 
per cent foreign ownership in subscribed 
capital. This group consisted of 43 
branches, and was called foreign assem-
blers. The second group had similar pat-
terns of production inputs and sales, but 
were not dominated by foreign owners. 
This group incorporated 8 branches, and 
we called them subcontractors. The third 
group sold over 30 per cent of output 
on foreign markets, but had a lower 
level of imported inputs. Twenty 
branches of this group were called ex-
port driven branches. Lastly, the fourth 
group included 28 branches with low 
levels of exports and imports. They were 
called domestic oriented manufacturing 
branches. The 8 measures were: (1) 
change in the share of sales revenues, 
(2) change in the share of employment, 
(3) relative investment effort (cumulated 
investment/cumulated sales), (4) change 
in per capita value added, (5) change in 
per capita cash-flow, (6) change in per 
capita sales, (7) growth rate in the share 
in domestic demand, (8) growth rate in 
domestic sales. Table 9 summarizes the 
results of the calculations. 
The main result of this exercise was 
the recognition that there were signifi-
cant differences between groups of 
branches in the Hungarian economy. 
However, these differences were regis-
tered only between the domestic market 
oriented group, and the two export-
oriented groups (including the assem-
blers). Since the subcontractor group 
consisted only eight branches, we omitted 
them. Not only differed domestic oriented 
branches from both other groups, but 
the tests did not show major differences 
between the assemblers and exporters. 
This means that due to differing market 
orientation measures of trade-intensive 
branches are usually different than do-
mestic sales oriented branches. The first 
conclusion from this result is that much 
of the standard error in the previous 
structural calculations can be traced 
back to inherently different business 
structures in trade oriented and in do-
mestic market oriented manufacturing 
branches.  
A little more analysis of the measures 
also discovers some interesting features 
of this split of manufacturing branches. 
The stars in Table 8 show those T values 
that were significantly lower than the 
critical T level, which means that there 
was no extraordinary distortion in the 
two samples compared concerning the 
given measure, hence differences in the 
average values of the measures were 
Table 9 
Comparisons of three groups of manufacturing branches through eight variables 
 




















Gr.1 Average 2.94 4.88 0.071 0.82 -27.83 22.41 51.09 -58.31 
 Std. 69.45 30.48 0.029 35.01 24.22 60.21 194.05 274.58 
Gr.3 Average -14.50 -2.46 0.072 0.47 0.75 7.92 5.64 3.48 
 Std. 15.50 19.62 0.032 15.16 167.65 14.91 25.10 30.67 
Gr.4 Average 12.49 2.48 0.083 17.29 -9.64 26.01 15.59 42.47 
 Std. 89.92 56.67 0.142 41.29 31.34 28.44 70.54 145.61 
1-3  F 20.07 2.41 1.18 5.33 47.92 16.30 59.74 80.12 
1-4 F 1.67 3.45 23.33 1.39 1.67 4.48 7.56 3.55 
 T estim 4.47*   11.08* 14.41*   -2.01** 
 T critic 1.667   1.667 1.667   1.703 
3-4 F 33.65 8.34 19.62 7.41 28.6 3.63 7.89 22.53 
 T estim    1.97**  2.86**   
 T critic    1.729  1.729   
* Simple T test 
** Welsh-type T values 
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significant and not random. There was 
one measure where domestic oriented 
branches differed from both the assem-
blers and the exporters: in per capita 
value added. The average was below 1 
for the trade dependent branches and 
was over 17 for the domestic oriented 
firms. The difference was therefore quite 
large: branches producing for the do-
mestic market produced much higher 
level of added value than exporters and 
assemblers. Per capita sales, cash 
flow/sales, share in sales and growth in 
domestic sales were the 4 further meas-
ures where domestic oriented branches 
performed significantly differently than 
others. And if we take a look at the av-
erages, it is interesting that in all these 
cases their average values were higher 
than those of the assemblers and export-
ers. It seems that in the case of a vari-
ety of performance measures domestic 
oriented firms performed better. This 
finding stresses again the relative impor-
tance of domestic markets and domestic 
demand on structural changes of the 
Hungarian manufacturing industry.  
The previous body of the research 
tried to map the relationship of per-
formance/ competitiveness and structural 
change. We used a variety of measures 
in order to see which indicators de-
scribed best the relationship, provided it 
existed and was significant. We found 
that value-added-based measures re-
sponded most sensitively, and showed the 
strongest relationship.  
The various measures described differ-
ent aspects of the relationships. Profit-
ability, income generating power, invest-
ments were all measures that tried to 
characterize capital owners’ logic that 
makes them investing in one industry 
rather than in another. Structural 
changes in manufacturing were regarded 
as a result of this logic: the weight of 
those branches should increase where 
there is some kind of advantage when 
compared with other branches that 
makes certain industries more attractive 
for investments than others. Structural 
change itself was described by various 
measures to test which best describes the 
process. 
* 
We did not succeed in obtaining conclu-
sive results as concerns the “best indica-
tors” of structural change and of per-
formance/competitiveness. Many aspects 
proved to be important. The best per-
forming few measures were therefore 
combined and two composite measures 
of competitiveness were created. Competi-
tiveness is clearly influenced by both 
supply side abilities but also by demand 
side changes. Our analysis proved the 
importance of both sides. 
The supply side indicator included 
four aspects of competitiveness. Average 
growth rate of market share described 
the flexibility of branches to improve po-
sitions on markets. Change in unit la-
bour cost relative to EU average pro-
vided information about change in the 
competitive factor that was regarded as 
most important for the new member-
states: the relative cost of labour. But 
not only the changes of labour cost were 
regarded important, but also differences 
in the relative wage levels of the various 
branches, compared to patterns in the 
EU 15. The third part of the composite 
was therefore relative per capita wage 
level. The fourth indicator was relative 
investment efforts with the argument that 
structural change was linked to changing 
competitiveness if it was a result of new 
investments. For production structure 
might also change without having signifi-
cant investments, but in this case com-
petitiveness would hardly change. As 
concerns the demand side composite 
measure, we created an indicator that 
described demand growth on both the 
domestic and the main export markets. 
Structural change was described by three 
indicators. The first was change in the 
branches’ shares in total manufacturing 
employment. The second was change in 
the branches’ shares in total value 
added. The third indicator was net job 
loss or creation in the branches.  
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A table in the Appendix contains the 
rankings that we achieved for the com-
posite supply side and composite demand 
side competitiveness measures. It is 
rather clear when comparing the figures 
of the same industries in the two col-
umns that there were significant differ-
ences between the two types of rankings. 
There were only 24 branches where the 
difference between the two rankings was 
less than 10 positions that would perhaps 
mean a strong fit of the two types of 
competitiveness measures. On the other 
hand, there were large differences, like 
83 positions in the case of branch 267 
or 69 positions in case of branch 351. 
These big differences emphasize the fact 
that the combination of the two types of 
competitiveness measures is hardly possi-
ble.  
Using these mentioned indicators, we 
created order of rank of the industries, 
and using Spearman rank correlation we 
tried to find link between these rankings. 
As in Table 10 (in which we presents 
the supply side indicators individually 
and as composite too) one can see we 
found weak but significant correlation 
(on 5 percent significance level) between 
the supply side composite measure and 
share in value added, and the demand 
side composite measure and both share 
in employment and share in value added.  
 
Figures in Table 10 can be interpreted 
as follows. From the three structural 
change indicators changes in the share 
of employment showed the better, not 
strong but significant correlation to both 
the demand side and the supply side 
composite competitiveness measures. 
Changes in the share of value added 
proved to have significant correlation 
only with the demand side composite 
competitiveness measure. The third struc-
tural change measure, job creation and 
loss in the branches did not show sig-
nificant correlation. The supply side 
measure had only one significant correla-
tion (with changes in branches’ shares in 
employment). But this correlation was 
very weak. 
Demand side composite competitiveness 
measure proved to have significant cor-
relation with two of the three structural-
change measures used here (share in 
labour and value added). The correlation 
is not very strong but existing. This can 
be explained in three ways, and suppos-
edly all are equally important. First is 
that not all industries could use the pos-
sibility that market size growth provided 
them. Second, that not all industries 
could use it with the same effectiveness. 
And the third reason behind the weak 
correlation could be that the optimal or 
potential level of value added and em-
ployment at a specific level of production 
Table 10 
Spearman rank correlation measures of the various performance 
and structural change measures 
 











Side 1  –0.02 0.02 –0.02 –0.47 –0.08 –0.01 0.08 0.03 
Side 2   0.00 0.01 –0.51 –0.25 –0.04 -0.34 0.14 
Side 3    –0.11 –0.48 –0.04 0.39 0.02 0.09 
Side 4     –0.45 –0.02 –0.03 0.04 0.06 
Supply side composite     0.16 0.21 0.09 –0.19 
Demand side composite     0.37 0.30 0.07 
Structural: Labour      0.60 0.08 
Structural: Value Added       –0.02 




is different in the various industries, so 
the reaction of these to changes in mar-
ket size could be different. But the fact 
that we were able to find a link between 
market size and structural indicators 
means that Hungarian manufacturing 
industries were able to react to the 
market signals and could use the possi-
bilities of growing markets, but also suf-
fered from the diminishing possibilities 
that declining markets provided. 
Two other links can be seen in our 
table. Both of them were related to wage 
costs. First is the positive correlation be-
tween our third supply side component 
(change of relative wage level relative to 
the EU) and the change of share in total 
manufacturing employment. In our case 
this means that during our period of 
analysis those industries increased their 
share in total manufacturing employment 
in which wage level related to the aver-
age manufacturing wage level decreased 
relative to the same measure of the EU 
industries. It means that Hungary was 
on the way to specialize its manufactur-
ing production to those industries where 
the relative advantage in wages is the 
highest with respect the EU. So the im-
portant question is not the absolute wage 
level of the industries, but the relative 
one! 
The second component (relative labour 
cost intensity) of the supply side compos-
ite also showed significant correlation 
with changes in branches shares’ meas-
ured by value added. The correlation 
was negative, meaning that those 
branches’ share increased in manufactur-
ing value added, which had decreasing 
labour cost intensity relative to the EU. 
Or put it the other way: branches that 
became more labour intensive in com-
parison with the EU lost weight in the 
production of value added.  
CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Hungarian manufacturing industry 
underwent fundamental changes dur-
ing the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Structural change was more vigorous 
than in developed EU countries. The 
process had two major components, 
which only partly overlapped in time: 
a strong contraction process which 
was especially important during the 
twin transition crisis years (1992–3 
and 1995–6). The establishment of 
new capacities was the other main 
element of structural change. This 
process speeded up especially after 
1997 when large scale foreign in-
vestments started operation.  
(2) The process did not show strong 
linkages with the growth pattern of 
the economy. Contrary to the com-
mon hypothesis structural change 
seemed to be less turbulent during 
the years of high growth, and 
showed higher intensity in recession 
periods. Also, the high rate of re-
structuring remained until the end of 
the period. This means that changes 
were fuelled by several factors, only 
one of which was the reorganization 
of the economy after the twin crisis.  
(3) Most stable growing sectors were the 
ones that supplied the domestic mar-
kets. The expansion of living stan-
dards and consumption provided 
very good opportunities for many 
branches producing consumer goods. 
On the other hand, despite of huge 
foreign investments, the share of ex-
port-oriented manufacturing indus-
tries grew only in few cases, in 
parts of the electronics and automo-
tive industry. But there was no fun-
damental shift into these industries. 
In other cases branches’ shares in 
production or employment might 
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even decline despite of important 
foreign investments. This happened 
when, for example, domestic compa-
nies further contracted, or when for-
eign companies gave up certain ac-
tivities in order to concentrate pro-
duction on just few products. 
(4) Out of the three main indicators of 
structural change value added pro-
vided the most important information, 
employment and sales were less use-
ful.  
(5) The shift share analysis of productiv-
ity change proved that productivity 
increased also in Hungary mainly 
through “within growth”, that is im-
provements achieved within given in-
dustries, and not primarily through 
shifting towards more productive 
branches. Sectoral change influenced 
the process to some extent negatively, 
since specialization increased in those 
industries which had less than aver-
age productivity gain potential (nega-
tive dynamic shift effect). This may 
be because fastest growing Hungar-
ian industries have achieved an al-
ready very high level of productivity, 
but also because fastest growing in-
dustries are such that do not provide 
much opportunity for productivity 
gains. 
(6) The calculations could provide some 
evidence on existing economic ration-
ale behind structural change. 
Branches with higher level of cash 
flow and profits tended to grow 
faster than others. 
(7) In the observed period competitive-
ness did not influence the size of 
branches (measured by sales turnover 
or employment). But it did influence 
the value added content of the 
branches. This means that there was 
less statistically captured change 
among sectors during the period 
1998–2003. The essence of the 
changes was rather the quicker in-
crease of value added in certain 
branches. This finding corroborates 
with earlier empirical experiences.  
(8) The fit of correlation was increased 
when groups of branches were sepa-
rated according to their specialization 
and ownership pattern. The basic di-
vide among firms concerning profit-
ability and growth potential was their 
market orientation: domestic market 
oriented firms had the better chances 
to grow.  
 




Rankings generated using supply and demand composite competitiveness indicators 
 















151 39 75 203 57 18 267 86 3 316 1 39 
152 83 89 204 79 40 268 51 47 321 90 83 
153 65 67 205 34 62 271 58 59 322 53 5 
154 87 88 211 70 8 272 9 45 323 18 86 
155 49 77 212 36 79 273 26 87 331 48 30 
156 55 76 221 60 55 274 12 28 332 45 23 
157 84 81 222 73 63 281 7 26 334 27 16 
158 55 66 232 88 25 282 61 14 335 41 70 
159 46 46 241 39 34 283 85 22 341 33 2 
171 53 80 242 30 72 286 50 33 342 10 35 
172 70 57 243 21 65 287 68 60 343 6 1 
174 24 90 244 44 74 291 32 32 351 89 20 
175 52 71 245 36 37 292 27 49 352 43 9 
176 69 58 246 65 61 293 24 36 353 27 50 
177 21 69 247 59 41 294 11 10 354 21 64 
181 77 13 251 75 31 295 20 12 355 72 85 
182 34 84 252 64 42 296 16 27 361 31 38 
183 63 52 261 13 51 297 46 24 362 15 78 
191 75 82 262 80 15 311 74 7 363 5 11 
192 91 91 263 16 68 312 4 4 364 7 19 
193 61 73 264 14 53 313 3 6 365 2 44 
201 82 56 265 80 43 314 78 29 366 67 48 




Methodology for calculations of new Composite Competitiveness measures and ranks 
(supply side and demand side), and for structural indicators. 
 
Necessary basic data (home country data by industry [3-digit-level] if otherwise not in-
dicated): 
 
Total sales of domestic producers: S 
Total import: IM 
Total export: EX 
Total sales of EU: Se 
Total import of EU: IMe 
Total export of EU: EXe 
Home country export to EU: EXte 
Labour cost (total): LC 
Labour cost (total) in the EU: LCe 
Investment: I 




Amount of wages and salaries int he EU (without social contribution): We 
Employment int he EU: Le 
Value added: VA 
 
Not compulsory: 
Jobs lost: JL 
Joibs created: JC 
 
Supply side composite ranking: 
 
We decided to compose four indicators: 
 
1. Average growth rate of market share(s) 
 
Domestic demand = DD = S-EX+IM 
Market share on domestic market = MS = (S-EX)/DD 
EU demand = DDe = Se-EXe+IMe 
Market share on EU market = MSe = EXte/DDe 
 





























where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. Excel can 
produce this X, using the logaritmic fitting function. The name of the function is 
maybe different (i do not have the English version of the Excel)). Thus (X-1)*100 will 
be a kind of average growth rate (in percentage points) of market share of the given 
industry. Using X, we can have a ranking of our industries. Industry with the highest 
X will gain the rank 1.  
 
 
2. Labour cost/sales relative to EU 
 








































where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. 
 
Thus (X-1)*100 will be a kind of average growth rate (in percentage points) of labour 
cost/sales relative to EU of the given industry. Using X, we can have a ranking of our 
industries. Industry with the lowest X will gain the rank 1.  
 
 
3. Relative wage level relative to the EU 














During our consultation the Hungarian team decided to use this simple indicator in-
stead of that mentioned in the previous version of the description of methodology, be-
cause we believe this is more closely related to structural changes. If we have our 







where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. 
 
Thus (X-1)*100 will be a kind of relative wage level relative to EU of the given indus-
try. Using X, we can have a ranking of our industries. The industry with the highest 
X will gain the rank 1. X-1 is the slope again. 
 
 
4. Investment/sales (RI) 
 
RI = ΣI/ΣS 
 
where Σ means sum of yearly (investment or sales) figures for the whole period. 
 
The industry with the highest RI will gain the rank 1. 
 
 
The composite ranking: 
 
For our WP3 work, we needed a composite rank indicator. Using our just calculated 
four ranks we can have a composite rank of supply side performance/competitiveness, 
which can be calculated as follows: 
 
For every industry we have four ranks, which mean four value between 1 and about 
100 (it depends on how many industry in the individual country we can count). If we 
find (separately for every industry) Y which minimize the value of the next expression, 
using the value of Y for the different industries we can have our final ranking. The 








where Ri is the ranking created using by the i





Demand side composite ranking: 
 
Growth rate of demand will be calculated as a composite of domestic demand growth 
and EU demand growth, where the weights are similar that of indicator one of the 
supply side indicator, namely the importance of the given market for the given indus-






























where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. 
 
Thus (X-1)*100 will be a kind of average growth rate of the demand for the products 
of the given industry. Using X, we can have a ranking of our industries. The industry 





We decided to use 2 or 3 structural indicators: 
 


















where ΣL is the total employment in manufacturing. 
 








where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. 
 
Thus (X-1)*100 will be the average growth of weight (in percentage points) of the 
given industry in the total employment in manufacturing. Using X, we can have a 
ranking of our industries. The industry with the highest X will gain the rank 1.  
 
 






























where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. 
 
Thus (X-1)*100 will be the average growth (in percentage points) of weight of the 
given industry in the total value added in manufacturing. Using X, we can have a 
ranking of our industries. The industry with the highest X will gain the rank 1. X-1 is 
the slope again. 
 
 
3. Jobs lost – jobs created 
 
This is a special indicator, which not necessarily can be calculated in every country. In 
the hungarian case, as we have firm-level data, we can separate the firms which in-
creased the number of employed persons, and the ones which decreased it. So we can 
have a sum of jobs lost and jobs created. Certainly it is not a perfect measure, but 
this is the best we can have. 
Using this data we can calculate an indicator of fluctuation of employment (FE): 
 
FE = (JL+JC)/L 










where Σ again means summing the values of all industry. 
 
Regarding this indicator we have to decide what form of it we want to use to gener-
ate a ranking. We can calculate the yearly change, or we can have a periodic sum. I 
propose to use yearly changes, which can be explained as the trend toward stabiliza-
tion of employment of the given industry. Yearly changes and ranking can be calcu-
lated again as: 
YC99=(RFE99-RFE98)/RFE98 
 








where YC1 is the first yearly change we have, and certainly YCn is the last. 
 
Thus (X-1)*100 will be the average pace toward stabilization of its employment portfo-
lio of the given industry. Using X, we can have a ranking of our industries. The in-




Aiginger, K. (2000): Speed of Change 
and Growth of Manufacturing. 
Cited by Marczewski and Szczygiel-
ski (2005) 
Borsi, B. – Molnár P. – Papaneg G. – 
Viszt E. (1998): Structural Changes 
in the Hungarian Foreign Trade 
and Industry between 1993 and 
1997. GKI Economic Research Co. 
Budapest, November 1998. 
Barriers to Entry and Growth of New 
Firms in Early Transition. A 
Comparative Study of Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Albania 
and Lithuania. Edited by Iraj Hoshi, 
Ewa Balcerowicz, Leszek Balcerowicz. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston/Dordrecht/London, 2002. 
Ewa Balcerowicz, Iraj Hoshi, Jan Mladek, 
Tamás Novák, Alison Sinclair, Miklós 
Szanyi (1998): ‘Downsizing as an 
Exit Mechanism: Comparing the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland’. In: Leszek Balcerowicz, 
Cheryl W. Gray and Iraj Hoshi 
(eds.): Enterprise Exit Processes in 
Transition Economies. Central 
European University Press, Budapest. 
Éltető, A. (1999): A külföldi működőtőke 
hatása a külkereskedelemre négy kis 
közép-európai országban (The Im-
pact of FDI on Foreign Trade of 
Four Small Central European Coun-
tries). Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 
46, No. 1, pp. 66–80. 
Fagerberg, J. (1999): Specialization and 
Growth: World Manufacturing Pro-
ductivity 1973–1990. mimeo 
Gacs, J. (2003): ‘Structural Change and 
Catching Up: the Experience of the 
Ten Candidate Countries’. In: Noltie, 
H. J. (ed.): Economic Convergence 
and Divergence in Europe. Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Grosfeld I. – Roland G. (1996): Defensive 
and Strategic Restructuring in 
Central European Enterprises. 
Journal of Transforming Economies 
and Societies, 3(4):21-46. 
Hunya, G. (2002): Recent Impacts of For-
eign Direct Investment on Growth 
and Restructuring in Central Euro-
pean Transition Countries. WIIW 
Research Reports, No. 284, May 
2002 
Marczewski, K. – Szczygielski, K. (2005): 
Process of Structural Change in 
Polish Manufacturing between 
1995–2003: Characteristics and Fac-
tors. mimeo 
Peneder, M. (2002), Structural Change 
and Aggregate Growth. WIFO 
Working Paper No. 182, Austrian 
Institute of Economic Research, 
Vienna. 
Savona, M. (2004): Structural Change 
and Macro-economic Performance: 
the Structural Bonus Hypothesis in 
Services. mimeo. 
Szanyi M. (1999): ‘The Role of FDI in 
Restructuring and Modernization: an 
Overview of Literature’. In: G. 
Hunya (ed.): Integration through 
Foreign Direct Investment – Making 
Central Europe Competitive (Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 1999), pp. 50–
80. 
Wyznikiewicz, B. (1987): Zmiany Struk-
turalne w Gospodarce. Rawidlowo-
sci I Organiczenia, Warszawa, 
PWE. Cited by Marczewski and 
Szczygielski (2005). 
Wziątek – Kubiak A. (2003): Critical 
Synthesis, Review of the Main 
Findings, Methodologies and 
Current Thought on Competitiveness 
of Accession Countries. Mapping of 
Competence. mimeo 
 
 
